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TAGS: [MNUC](#) [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [IR](#) [BE](#)
SUBJECT: BELGIAN VIEWS ON IRANIAN PROLIFERATION AND
SANCTIONS

REF: A. STATE 95073
[1](#)B. STATE 10153
[1](#)C. STATE 103219
[1](#)D. BRUSSELS 1248

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Classified By: Acting Political Economic Counselor Robert Kiene, reason
1.4(b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: In a joint demarche, political officers from the United States, the United Kingdom and France urged Werner Bauwens, the Belgian MFA's Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, to show concern about the recently revealed clandestine uranium enrichment facility in Iran, and to keep pressure on Iran to comply with UNSC resolutions. Bauwens said the GOB is solidly behind the dual track policy and is equally as concerned about Iranian intentions as the U.S., the UK and France. He urged his EU colleagues to begin preparing for new sanctions in case they are needed. He expressed a deep distrust of Iranian intentions and warned against allowing the pressure to slacken on Iran in return for possibly illusory promises of cooperation. He said the GOB intends to stress the need for action by Iran during an upcoming visit by the Vice President of China, with Russia and with others. Finally, Bauwens said that he still supports "deepening" of sanctions as opposed to "widening" them, since the former will be easier to overcome Russian reluctance to hinder trade with Iran and pass a new resolution. He explained "deepening" as tightening restrictions in areas already addressed by UNSC resolutions. End Summary.

PREACHING TO THE CHOIR ON IRAN

[1](#)2. (C) On October 6, Poloff met with Werner Bauwens, the Belgian MFA's Special Envoy for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation issues. He discussed the covert Iranian uranium enrichment plant near Qom with Bauwens and delivered ref B points in the company of two diplomats from the UK and French Embassies in Brussels. These diplomats had been requested by their capitals to make a joint demarche with the United States Embassy on the Qom facility. Poloff delivered the U.S. expression of concern and urged Bauwens and the GOB to keep pressure on the Iranians to deliver on their promises at the October 1 Geneva meeting and their UN commitments. After that, the French diplomat reinforced his government's serious concern about the Qom facility as evidence of Iran's lack of trustworthiness and violation of international commitments. He told Bauwens that the French government wants a rapid reaction from the IAEA, inspecting the site and delivering a detao the IAEA's El Baradai.

GOB WARNS: DON'T TRUST IRAN OR LET UP PRESSURE

14. (C) Bauwens pointed out the risk that Iran will get away cheaply based on its supposedly "coming clean" about Qom. In fact, he said, Iran had a continuing obligation that it ignored to disclose the facility, which it had breached. Revealing the plant is "not a present" and is long overdue. He called on the IAEA and the P5 1 to keep their feet on the ground, not to get distracted, and to realize that their Iranian interlocutors have a long history of manipulation. Bauwens mentioned that EU representative Solana is talking to the IAEA's Al Baradai. He warned that it will take weeks for the IAEA to analyze facts gained during its visit to Qom. The report is likely to go to the IAEA board in November. He asked that Washington pay close attention to the timing of meetings with the Iranians. The danger is that the Iranians

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will say in their October meeting with the P5 1 that they have "done all" and seek a gesture in return. They have played similar tricks in the past, making a gesture to which its opponents are too forthcoming. As usual, the Iranians will be trying to buy time, and Qom may not even be the last facility they have yet to reveal, he said.

EU SHOULD PREPARE FOR NEW SANCTIONS

15. (C) Belgium fully supports the dual track approach of dialogue and sanctions, Bauwens said. The GOB is resolved to "deepen" the sanctions path as long as necessary, despite the optimism generated in Geneva. Turning to the UK and French diplomats, he said that the EU must explore what future sanctions might look like. It is time to seriously analyze what economic areas to aim at and what the EU expects to get out of sanctions. Best to do it today, he concluded.

PUSHING CHINA AND RUSSIA

16. (C) Bauwens said that the Vice President of China is visiting Brussels soon. The GOB intends to take any opportunity to press the Iran issue with him and other Chinese officials, with Russia and with the temporary members of the UN Security Council. He added that all countries must do so in order to gain the full impact of sanctions. He regretted that UN Security Council resolutions tend to "go to the lowest common denominator," but believes that it is necessary to push for as much as can be obtained in the Security Council. Only new facts should push the process in another direction, Bauwens said, and he does not see the facts now. He sees only missile tests, procurement efforts, dissimulation and a conventional arms buildup.

EXPLORING THE SHAPE OF "DEEPER" SANCTIONS

17. (C) Bauwens said that he had met with representatives of Belgian industry to remind them of the dangers of dealing with Iran. He also wanted to discuss where Belgian industry might be hurt by a toughened sanctions regime. He said that he had little response, but still will be looking for some "red areas" where sanctions would seriously impact Belgian trade. He is sure that other European countries are doing the same. Poloff recalled Bauwens' expressed preference for "deepening" of sanctions rather than "widening" them. Bauwens said that he fears that "widening" the sanctions to include a large number of categories of goods and services will engender a protracted discussion in the UNSC about the overall usefulness of sanctions. He believes that the concept of "deepening" sanctions in areas already mentioned in UNSC resolutions is less disturbing to Russia than widening them to a full range of items -- especially in light of what Bauwens sees as Russia's lack of real interest in solving the Iranian nuclear problem. As an example of what he means by deepening sanctions, he referred to the current UNSCR requirement that countries be "vigilant" on sales of

conventional military goods to Iran. "Deepening" that requirement would involve at the extreme an arms embargo, or at least "whatever we can get the Russians to sign on to."

18. (C) Bauwens summed up by saying that it is clear the Israelis are very nervous about Iran's intentions and that they need to see that the P5 1 and others are committed to making real progress with the Iranians.

EASON

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